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ABSTRACT
Smartphones, the devices we carry everywhere with us, are
being heavily tracked and have undoubtedly become a ma-
jor threat to our privacy. As “Tracking the trackers” has be-
come a necessity, various static and dynamic analysis tools
have been developed in the past. However, today, we still
lack suitable tools to detect, measure and compare the on-
going tracking across mobile OSs. To this end, we propose
MobileAppScrutinator, based on a simple yet efficient dy-
namic analysis approach. To demonstrate the current trend
in tracking, we select 140 most representative apps available
on both Android and iOS AppStores and test them with Mo-
bileAppScrutinator. In fact, choosing the same set of apps
on both Android and iOS also enables us to compare the
ongoing tracking on these two OSs. Finally, we also discuss
the effectiveness of privacy safeguards available on Android
and iOS. We show that neither Android nor iOS privacy
safeguards in their present state are completely satisfying.
Keywords
Third-Party Tracking, Personally-Identifiable Information
(PII) leakage, Privacy, Android, iOS, Dynamic Analysis
1. INTRODUCTION
Smartphones no longer involve only the user and the com-
munication service (GSM/CDMA) provider. The revolution
of the AppStore model for application distribution brings
a large number of new actors. In the literature, service
providers to whom the user directly interacts with are con-
sidered as first-party, the user being the second-party. How-
ever, there are many additional actors whose services are not
directly used by the end user, and whose presence is not obvi-
ous to most users, are called the third-parties. Third parties
are, for example, Advertisers and Analytics (A&A) compa-
nies, application performance monitors, crash reporters, or
push notification senders. The situation has become even
more complex with the development of new advertisement
models like Mobile Ad Networks or Ad exchange networks
for real-time bidding (RTB).
Depending on the service provided, a user may accept
to exchange data with a first-party, in general following le-
gal terms and conditions upon which they mutually agree.
However, the data collection by third-parties without ex-
plicit user consent is more problematic. Due to economic
reasons, the A&A companies are the dominant third parties
and the most privacy intrusive. Indeed, in order to increase
their revenue, advertisers want to send personalized Ads to
the user. Therefore A&A companies are incited to collect as
much information as possible to better profile user’s interests
and behavior. In order to achieve this goal, they need a way
to identify the smartphone/user via an identifier that can
uniquely be associated with a smartphone/user. This whole
process of data collection is called “third-party smart-
phone tracking” or simply “tracking” and the process
of showing user-specific Ads based on user profile is called
“targeted advertising”.
Smartphone tracking and targeted-advertising are accept-
able if the user is aware of it and if he agrees to receive tar-
geted Ads based on his personal interests. Some users could
also find the presence of third-parties on the smartphone
beneficial. However, problems arise when A&A companies
collect Personally-Identifiable Information (PII) without users’
knowledge. In fact, Ad libraries sometimes also include
APIs through which an application can deliberately leak user
PII [1]. This creates serious privacy risks for users. With
the rapidly growing number of smartphones, people are in-
creasingly exposed to such risks. Moreover, a smartphone
is particularly intrusive, revealing all user movements as it
is equipped with many sensors, and it stores a plethora of
information either generated by these sensors, by the tele-
phony services (calls and SMS), or by the user himself (e.g.,
calendar events and reminders). Finally, various scandals in
the past (e.g.,[2, 3]) make it difficult to trust all these actors
present on smartphones.
Motivation.
As “Tracking these trackers” has become a necessity, var-
ious tools have been developed in the past. These tools
are based on either static analysis or dynamic analysis or
interception of network traffic. Even though static analysis
techniques scale well, they generally fail on obfuscated appli-
cations and therefore, are not suited to accurately detect and
measure the ongoing tracking. Similarly, network intercep-
tion is often unable to handle SSL traffic. Dynamic analysis
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techniques for detection and measurement of PII leaks are
available on Android but not on iOS. As we lack suitable dy-
namic analysis tools readily available on both Android and
iOS, there is no measurement study in the literature which
provides concrete evidence of ongoing tracking as well as the
comparision across mobile OSs.
Contributions.
The contributions of this paper are threefold:
1. We present our dynamic analysis platform, MobileApp-
Scrutinator, which detects and measure the ongoing
tracking on Android and iOS. It is the first dynamic
analysis platform for iOS to detect private data leak-
age.
2. We detect private information leaks by applications
over the Internet, when they leak it in clear-text or
over SSL. MobileScrutinator detects the PII leakage
even if the App obfuscates the data (by hashing or en-
crypting) before sending over the network in clear-text
or through SSL. Detection of modified PII is a key for
reliable measurements as some identifiers (e.g., WiFi
MAC address, AndroidID, IMEI) are often modified
before being sent.
3. We test 140 popular applications with MobileAppScruti-
nator, on both Android and iOS, and report our find-
ings with a comparision of ongoing tracking on these
two platforms.
4. Finally, we discuss the effectiveness of privacy safe-
guards available on both Android and iOS. We show
that neither Android nor iOS privacy safeguards in
their present state are completely satisfying.
2. RELATED WORK
Our work can be compared with existing works on two
axes: 1) Tracking measurement technology/tools and 2) Mea-
surement of PII leakage. Below we discuss and compare our
work with some most representative works along these two
axes.
2.1 Tracking measurement technology
Tools to measure the ongoing tracking might be based
on either interception of generated network traffic, or static
analysis of the application code, or dynamic analysis of ap-
plications.
Interception of generated network traffic.
This approach is based on snooping the network data us-
ing Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) proxy. For example, Mo-
bileScope [4], based on MITM proxy, was used in WSJ study [2]
to investigate the top 100 applications on both Android and
iOS. However, this technique cannot be used to intercept the
SSL traffic which seriously limits the effectiveness of this ap-
proach; as we see in Sections 5 and 6 that almost half of PII
leakage is through SSL. Additionally, MITM approach will
not be able to detect reliably the leakage of PII generated
by the system (values not known to the user and therefore,
could not be searched in the network traffic). This includes
different PII, for example, unique IDs generated and shared
by applications and user location. Also, MITM based ap-
proach would fail in cases where user PII is modified (e.g.,
hashed or encrypted) before being sent (and, as we will show,
this is a rather common practice). Finally, being a network
packet analysis approach, it is not always easy or feasible to
identify the application having generated the monitored traf-
fic, which makes the (manual) analysis even more complex.
MobileAppScrutinator, in contrast, makes analysis directly
at the operating system level, and thus does not suffer from
such limitations.
Static analysis.
Past works (PiOS [5] on iOS, FlowDroid [6], ScanDroid [7],
CHEX [8], AndroidLeaks [9], SymDroid [10], ScanDal [11]
and AppIntent [12] on Android) are based on static anal-
ysis to detecte a flow of data from a PII source to a net-
work sink. These works can be classified in two categories:
1) static tainting-based (e.g., FlowDroid [6], ScanDroid [7],
CHEX [8], AndroidLeaks [9]) and 2) symbolic execution
based (e.g., SymDroid [10], ScanDal [11] and AppIntent [12]).
Among the ones based on symbolic execution, SymDroid [10]
designs a symbolic executor based on their simple version of
Dalvik VM, i.e., micro-dalvik. Similarly, ScanDal [11] de-
signs an intermediate language, called Dalvik Core, and col-
lects all the program states during the execution of the pro-
gram for all inputs. Considering the Android’s special event-
driven paradigm, AppIntent [12] proposes a more efficient
event-space constraint guided symbolic execution. On iOS,
PiOS was designed for binaries compiled with GCC/G++
compiler and since then, Apple switched to LLVM compiler.
Therefore, PiOS needs to be adapted to support the analysis
of binaries compiled with LLVM. Furthermore, PiOS is not
available publicly, so one needs to build it from scratch to
use it to detect and measure the ongoing tracking. In gen-
eral, static analysis techniques do scale well but they lack
dynamic information tracking and therefore, lead to false
negatives.
Dynamic analysis.
TaintDroid [13] and PMP [14] are based on dynamic anal-
ysis on Android and iOS respectively. On Android, Taint-
Droid is a dynamic taint-based technique to detect and mea-
sure private data leakage. However, TaintDroid has its own
limitations: 1) taint-based tracking can be easily circum-
vented using indirect information flows [15] 2) requires to
make a trade-off between false positives and false negatives
([13] did not taint IMSI due to false positives) 3) misses
native code (both for taint propagation and as a source of
information). On iOS, PMP [14] is a dynamic/runtime tool
that offers the functionality of choosing access to what in-
formation a user is willing to share with a particular appli-
cation. As iOS’s own privacy control feature provides the
same functionality, PMP [14] is an enhancement in terms
of the number of different types of private data considered.
In fact, PMP fails to notify users if the accessed informa-
tion is being sent to a remote server or not. As existing
dynamic analysis tools on iOS are not sufficient to measure
the ongoing tracking on iOS, one possibility could have been
a taint-based dynamic analysis technique. However, this is
not possible to do on iOS device because the code of appli-
cations is native (C, C++ and Objective-C). Propagating
taint would require to emulate native code, which involves
serious changes to the system and would have a significant
performance penalty. Therefore, we opted for a dynamic
analysis approach, described in the next section, which can
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be used on both Android and iOS. To measure the effec-
tiveness of MobileAppScrutinator on Android with Taint-
Droid, we perform tests on identical set of applications us-
ing TaintDroid and MobileAppScrutinator. We found that
MobileAppScrutinator could detect a lot more PII leakage
than TaintDroid.
2.2 Measurement of PII leakage
To best of our knowledge, no previous work provides a
complete picture of tracking on Android and iOS. Web-
browser tracking has been thoroughly studied [16, 17], but
it is not the case with smartphone tracking. We are first
to provide detailed analysis and measurement data for both
Android and iOS. [18] sheds some light on third-party track-
ing being taken place on Android using TaintDroid but is
not as comprehensive as ours. Also, all other static and dy-
namic analysis tools proposed in the literature, for example,
PiOS [5] and TaintDroid [13], analyzed some applications
and presented a number of applications leaking user PII, but
none of them presented a complete analysis as we do in Sec-
tion 5 and 6. Also, as tracking technologies rapidly change
with OS revisions, it is crucial to have up-to-date tools and a
recent picture of tracking technology. Furthermore, we also
consider the remote servers where PII is sent and attempted
to distinguish them among first and third-parties, with the
available information.
3. MOBILEAPPSCRUTINATOR
Design choices.
From tracking detection and measurement point of view,
it is ideal to analyse what applications are doing at operating
system level. However, we want to have a system that does
not require too intrusive modifications of the OSs and does
not have too many false positives (unlike dynamic tainting-
based techniques). The system should work well with non-
malicious application on real devices so that it can be used
by anyone. Thus the design of MobileAppScrutinator starts
with a simple approach: intercepting the source, sink and
data manipulation system APIs. As the same approach is
applied to both Android and iOS, it enables us to compare
the tracking across mobile OSs. Even though MobileApp-
Scrutinator is based on this same simple approach on both
Android and iOS, i.e., the basic governing philosophy re-
mains the same, its implementation differs significantly due
to the differences of these OSs.
Overall architecture.
As developer APIs are public on both Android and iOS, we
are able to identify all source and sink methods (i.e., meth-
ods related to access or modification of private data along
with network operations either in clear-text or encrypted).
MobileAppScrutinator hooks these APIs and includes extra
code to these APIs. This added extra code collects various
information from the application environment. Specifically,
it collects information about PII being accessed, modified,
or transmitted by an application along with the informa-
tion about that application. Any access, or modification, or
transmission of PII corresponds to an event and is stored lo-
cally in an SQLite database. This database is later analyzed
automatically to detect and measure privacy leaks.
In the next two subsections, we give details of how Mo-
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Figure 1: MobileAppScrutinator Android implementation.
bileAppScrutinator is implemented on Android and iOS.
3.1 Implementation on Android
As the Android source (from Android Open Source Project
(AOSP)) is publicly available, MobileAppScrutinator directly
modifies source code of various APIs in Java frameworks.
This modified source is compiled and a new system image
is generated. We develop and add a system application to
this new system image. This system application runs two
Android services that are responsible for receiving data from
different sources. The App is also responsible for storage of
data in a local SQLite database.
As described earlier, our added extra code must send data
to MobileAppScrutinator system app. To do so, we use two
methods: AIDL1 and socket APIs of libc library. Our ex-
tra coded added in Android application frameworks APIs
uses AIDL to send data to MobileAppScrutinator system
app whereas socket APIs of libc library are used in modi-
fied core Java frameworks. Here it is to be noted that An-
droid application frameworks are written utilizing core Java
frameworks, i.e., during compilation of Android source, core
Java frameworks are compiled before the Android applica-
tion frameworks. As AIDL is part of the Android applica-
tion framework, the code added (by MobileAppScrutinator)
in modified core Java frameworks cannot use AIDL to send
data to MobileAppScrutinator system application. There-
fore, to send data to MobileAppScrutinator system apps
from modified APIs of core Java frameworks, MobileApp-
Scrutinator uses socket APIs of libc library. to send data
to a dedicated service running inside MobileAppScrutinator
system application. Fig. 1 provides a broad picture of how
MobileAppScrutinator is implemented on Android OS.
3.2 Implementation on iOS
Fig. 2a depicts an overall picture of implementation of
MobileAppScrutinator on iOS. The APIs of interest in iOS
frameworks are modified to capture and send data related
to application context as well as the PII being accessed,
modified, or transmitted (clear-text or SSL). The data com-
munication between various processes running our custom
1http://developer.android.com/guide/components/
aidl.html
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Figure 2: MobileAppScrutinator iOS implementation.
code and the daemon is through mach messages. In order
to execute self-signed code and get privileged access to the
system, the default iOS software stack needs to be modified
to remove the restrictions imposed by Apple (a technique
known as “Jailbreaking” in the iOS world).
On iOS, developers may write code in C, C++ and Objective-
C languages. In fact, all iOS executables are linked with
the Objective-C runtime [19] and this runtime environment
provides a method called method setImplementation. We
use this method to change the implementation of existing
Objective-C methods whereas to change the implementation
of C/C++ functions, we use the trampoline technique [20].
MobileSubstrate [21], an open-source framework, greatly sim-
plifies this task. Finally, the source code responsible for
modification of various APIs of interest is compiled into a
dynamic library (dylib) which is loaded using launchd [22],
into all or a subset of running processes. Fig. 2b depicts how
a dylib is loaded into a process using launchd.
3.3 Post-analysis of SQLite Data
The events stored in local SQLite database are processed
by automated Python scripts. It is a two-step process: a first
pass over the database on a per-application basis results into
a JSON file, and a second pass over the JSON file derives
various statistics.
Our first level analysis consists of the following steps:
1. Find all types of PII accessed by each application.
2. Check if PII is really sent over the network or not, and
if yes, to which server it is sent to.
3. Search for the PII in the input to data modification
APIs (cryptographic and hashing) and if found, look
for the result in the data sent over the network.
First-level analysis results into a JSON file that stores 1)
accessed PII, 2) PII passed to encryption or hash APIs 3)
(un)modified PII sent over the Internet in cleartext or using
SSL. Once the first pass over the database is finished, the
resulted JSON file containing per-App details is processed to
infer or derive various statistics. Here it is worth to mention
that various PII accessed by an application are searched only
in the network traffic and hash/cryptographic calls of that
specific application.
In various APIs, the access to data is at byte level and in
this case, the raw bytes are first attempted to be decoded
using UTF-8 encoding. Since a different encoding may be
used or in case of binary data, the hexadecimal representa-
tion of these raw bytes is also stored alongside. Searching in
the network, or in the input to cryptographic or hash APIs
is done for both UTF-8 encoded data and hexadecimal rep-
resentation of the raw bytes.
3.4 Limitations
The PII leakage would remain undetected if the data is
modified by the application developer using custom data
modification functions before sending it over the network.
If the PII is modified using OS provided data modification
APIs (e.g., encryption, hashing) before sending over net-
work, MobileAppScrutinator would correctly be able to de-
tect the PII leakage. As an App developer is not bound to
use system provided hash and encryption APIs, MobileApp-
Scrutinator might miss some PII leakage instances.
In addition to this, the current AppScrutinator implemen-
tation on Android only supports the Java code. Therefore
it currently does not detect PII leakage that involves calls
to C/C++ APIs using the JNI framework. However, this is
not a limitation of the approach and MobileAppScrutinator
could easily be extended to handle such cases. handle JNI
calls.
4. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In order to investigate the tracking mechanisms being used
by third-parties, we test 140 representative free Apps avail-
able both on Android and iOS (most popular Apps in each
category). Experiments have been conducted on iOS 6.1.2
and Android 4.1.1 r6.
We manually ran applications for approximately one minute
each. We could interact with some applications during this
one minute duration as others required the user to log in or
sign up. We did not sign up or log in as our ultimate goal was
not to track the manually entered user PII but the seamless
background tracking done without any user intervention/in-
teraction. Also, we did not try to cover all possible execu-
tion paths, indeed third-party library code generally starts
execution when the application is first launched.
Apart from device or operating system unique identifiers
and information, we also entered other synthetic information
such as addressbook, calendar events, accounts etc. This
enables us to know if such data is accessed and transmitted
by apps.
5. CROSS-APP THIRD-PARTY TRACKING
Smartphone users mostly use dedicated apps rather than
websites for accessing services, essentially because of the rel-
atively small screen size and the lack of mobile-optimized
web pages (even if this later aspect has largely improved).
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Figure 3: # Apps sending System identifiers (out of 140
apps).
Therefore user tracking is no longer performed only through
“third-party cookies”in web browsers but also in apps through
dedicated identifiers. In this section, we shed some light on
this ongoing user tracking in apps through stable identifiers.
5.1 Unique identifiers from the system
First of all, let us consider the system level unique iden-
tifiers. The situation is rather different depending on the
target OS.
5.1.1 Android.
Various system identifiers are available on Android. A
user permission is required to access hardware-tied identi-
fiers (IMEI and Wi-Fi MAC address) as well as SIM-tied
identifiers (IMSI and phone number). OS-tied identifiers
(Serial Number and AndroidID) identifiers are freely avail-
able to be accessed.
Fig. 3a presents the number of android apps (out of a to-
tal of 140 most popular apps tested) that transmit various
unique system identifiers over the Internet. We note that a
significant number of apps transmit hardware-tied identifiers
such as IMEI number and WiFi MAC address of the phone.
IMEI number alone is transmitted by 28 apps, i.e., by 20
% apps. This is very critical in terms of user privacy be-
cause users cannot reset hardware-tied identifiers (unlike a
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Figure 4: # servers where system identifiers are sent by 140
apps.
cookie in a web browser). Android ID is the most frequently
OS-tied identifier transmitted (by around 30% apps). In
general, SIM-tied identifiers are the least frequently trans-
mitted: IMSI is transmitted by five apps whereas three apps
transmitted the phone number. Interestingly, we also note
that most of these identifers are transmitted unmodified,
i.e., without hashing or encrypting, over the Internet. This
clearly demonstrates that app developers do not care at all
about user privacy and the legislation is not hard enough to
force the app developers to care about user privacy.
Fig. 4a presents the number of servers where unique sys-
tem identifiers are transmitted by 140 Android apps. The
servers are classified as either first-party or third-party or
unidentified. First-party servers are those where domain
name conincides with the app name, third-party servers are
domains of well known advertisers and trackers, and uniden-
tified are the ones where domain name is either of content
providers or ip addresses for which no hostname information
is found. We note here that various unique system identi-
fiers are transmitted to both first and third-parties. We also
find that various unique identifiers are also sent to some
IP addresses without any hostname information. It is not
easy to identify to whom such machines belong to and why
these identifiers are transmitted to them. However, we find
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that third-parties collect these unique identifiers more often
than first-parties. In fact, depending on the app permis-
sions, third parties try to collect as many identifiers as they
can: for instance, third-party domains like ad-x.co.uk, adx-
tracking.com and mobilecore.com all collect and send the
AndroidID, IMEI and WiFi-MAC address to their servers
in clear-text. Additionally, first and third-parties both send
frequently these unique identifiers over the Internet to their
servers unmodified (e.g., without hashing) and in clear-text
(without SSL). This is a serious threat to user privacy as a
network eavesdropper can easily correlate the data flowing
through the Internet. For interested raders, Table 1 in the
appendix of this paper provides the whole list of servers and
the corresponding unique identifiers transmitted to them by
140 Android apps in clear-text or through SSL.
Along with these unique system identifiers, third-parties
also collect and send the names of apps in which their code is
present. We notice that User-Agent http header field gener-
ally contains package/App name. As knowing the apps of a
user reveals a lot about user interests [23] and increases the
re-identification risk [24], this is a serious privacy threat.
In fact, the collection of such data is proportional to the
number of apps in which third-party code is present and
the number of apps sending these unique identifiers. So it
is interesting to quantify the number of apps sending these
unique identifiers to third-parties. Looking at both Fig. 4a
and Fig. 3a, it can easily be deduced that the presence of
third-parties in Android Apps is huge. Globally, we find
that 31% (44 out of 140) of Apps transmit, at least, one
(un)modified unique identifier over the Internet.
5.1.2 iOS.
Fig. 3b presents the number of iOS apps (out of a to-
tal of 140 most popular apps tested) that transmit various
unique system identifiers over the Internet. The “AdIden-
tifier” is transmitted the most, which is fine because it has
been specifically introduced for Advertizing and Analytics
purposes as a replacement to the deprecated UDID. How-
ever we notice that some companies (e.g., tapjoyads.com,
greystripe.com, mdotm.com, admob.com and ad-inside.com)
are still using deprecated UDID. We also found four apps
collecting the device name. In iOS, the device name (Devi-
ceName) is set by the user during the initial device setup and
often contains the user’s real name. Since this device name
is stable (the user generally does not modify it), even if it is
not guaranteed to be unique across all devices, it is a stable
identifer that can probably be used for tracking purposes.
Additionally, if it is set with the user’s real name, it may
reveal user identity. We also notice that these identifiers are
always collected when the user starts/stops interacting with
the app. This means that third-parties can even know how
long a user is using a particular app and the time when a user
goes idle, revealing user habits. As, globally, 60% (i.e., 84
out of 140) of apps send, at least, one (un)modified unique
identifier over the Internet, the risk in terms of privacy is
huge.
Fig. 4b presents the number of servers where unique sys-
tem identifiers are transmitted by 140 iOS apps. We find
a lot of apps transmitting AdIdentifier over the Internet to
their servers as well as third-parties. UDID is still being
used and transmitted by a total of 9 apps. Surprisingly,
the device name is transmitted to 5 servers. Out of these 5
servers, only 1 server belongs to a first-party whereas oth-
ers are either third-party or identified. In case of iOS, Wi-
Fi MAC address is the only hardware-tied identifier that is
available to be accessed. It is transmitted to both first and
third-parties. More details about servers where these unique
identifiers are sent, can be found in Table 3 in the appendix
of this paper
5.2 Unique identifiers generated by third-parties
Let us now consider unique identifiers generated by third-
parties in order to bypass OS restrictions. As access to sys-
tem unique identifier is limited on iOS, third-parties gener-
ate and share unique identifiers to have a mechanism to track
users across apps. However, apps are sandboxed on iOS (as
well as on Android) and therefore, these third-parties can-
not simply share those generated unique identifiers across
apps. To circumvent this limitation on iOS, third-parties
use a class called UIPasteBoard [25]. This is specifically
designed for cut/copy/paste operations with the ability to
share data between apps. The data shared by apps with this
class can be persistently stored even across device restarts.
Among the Apps we tested, we found that a large number of
third-parties use the UIPasteboard class to share a unique
third-party identifier across apps. Looking at the names and
types of pasteboards created and the servers where these val-
ues are sent, we found that 63 Apps create at least one new
pasteboard entry at the initiative of a third-party library
(Fig. 3b).
Essentially, third-party code present inside an applica-
tion stores a pasteboard entry with its unique name, type
and value. Later, if an App containing the code from the
same third-party is installed, it retrieves the value corre-
sponding to its pastebaord name. To have a look on paste-
board names, types and values used by various third-parties
present inside 140 iOS Apps tested, please refer to Table 7
in the appendix of this paper. Here it is to be noted that
user has no control over this kind of tracking and “Limit Ad
Tracking” feature of iOS is ineffective in this case.
From Fig. 4b, we note that these pastboard entries are
transmitted to various first and third-parties even though
pastboard entries are just designed for cut/copy/paste op-
eration between apps. Moreover, we find that pastboard en-
tries are more transmitted to third-parties than first-parties.
This assures our assumption that third-parties generate these
unique pastbaord entries to track users because they trans-
mit them over the Internet.
5.3 Comparation of third-party tracking on
Android and iOS
Comparing the identifiers transmitted by 140 most popu-
lar apps on Android and iOS reveals that iOS apps transmit
system identifiers more often than Android apps. However,
iOS apps mostly transmit dedicated identifier, i.e., advertis-
ing id, for tracking and advertising purposes and not many
apps transmit hardware-tied system identifiers as compared
to app on Android. This is probably due to the fact that
many system identifiers (hardware and SIM-tied identifiers
like IMEI, IMSI, and Serial number) are not available to be
accessed on iOS.
As opposed to iOS apps, we did not notice Android apps
generating and sharing unique systems identifiers for track-
ing purposes. This is probably because various system iden-
tifiers are readily avaialble to be accessed by apps on An-
droid and therefore, third-parites do not need to generate
6
their own identifiers. Indeed, identifiers such as serial num-
ber and Android ID do not even need a permission to be
accessed. As tracking through system identifiers is more re-
liable and accurate, trackers probably do not need to resort
to this solution.
In conclusion, Android makes available wider range of sys-
tem unique identifiers to apps as compared to iOS therefore
it is easier for third-parties to track Android users as com-
pared to iOS. Nevertheless, this does not stop trackers on
iOS which resort to other techniques.
6. COLLECTION OF OTHER PERSONAL
INFORMATION
To create a rich user profile, third-parties can use various
means to collect a wide variety of personal information:
1. By directly collecting as much information as possible
from the device (i.e., by adding the appropriate code
in the libraries to be included by the app developers).
2. By retrieving it from other third-parties who have al-
ready collected this information (thereby, aggregating
the user PII [26]).
3. By obtaining it from first-parties.
It is difficult to measure how much information are being
shared among third-parties themselves or among first and
third-parties, but we next measure in this section what kinds
of data and to which extent are being collected by these
third-parties directly from the smartphone.
6.1 Android
Various personal data of the user is available to be ac-
cessed for apps on Android so that various useful apps can
be developed. Such personal data includes, e.g., location of
the user, contacts or the accounts. Our experiments with
140 Android apps reveal that different kind of user personal
information is being sent over the Internet to various first
and third-parties.
Fig. 5a presents number of apps sending different kind of
data over the Internet. We see that network code and op-
erator name is sent by 17 and 16 apps respectively. User
location and accounts information is transmitted by six and
three apps respectively. Two apps transmit information
related to the Wi-Fi access point they are connected to
whereas one app transmit user contacts over the Internet.
Fig. 6a reveal that user location is transmitted (encrypted
or in clear-text) to nine third-parties whereas to three first
parties. In fact, it is more often sent to third-parties than
first-parties. We also find that user location is sent (en-
crypted or in clear-text) to nine third-parties whereas it is
sent to only three first-parties. This means that user loca-
tion is used more often for tracking and profiling the user
and not for providing a useful service. Otherwise, we also
note that the name of the telephony operator and the SIM
network code is being collected by a lot of first and third-
parties (details available in Table 5 in appendix).
Moreover, as the apps installed on a device is highly valu-
able information for trackers/advertisers to infer user in-
terests and habits, we detect and measure the leakage of
this information too. We find that 5 third-parties know 4
or more apps installed by a user. This puts users at se-
rious privacy risks as users can be re-identified later with
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Figure 5: # Apps sending PII out of a total of 140 apps.
high probablity [24]. Specifically, “tardemob.com”, present
in “Booking.com” App, collects the list of all apps installed
on the device and sends this list to its server (details avail-
able in Table 8 in appendix).
6.2 iOS
iOS also makes accessible many user PII sources (e.g.,
Accounts, Location, or Contacts) to apps. This is necessary
so that a wide variety of apps can be developed.
Figure 5b presents the number of apps sending user PII
over the Internet. We find that 10 apps (out of 140) send
user location over the Internet. SIM network (operator)
name and SIM number are transmitted most by iOS apps.
Device name is transmitted by four apps.
Fig. 6b shows whether the location data it is sent to first or
third-parties by these 10 apps. We find that it is sent to two
third-parties (to one in clear-text and one using SSL) and
three first-parties. SIM network name is mostly transmitted
to third-parties (details about the transmitted user data and
where it is sent to are available in Table 6 in the appendix).
6.3 Comparision between Android and iOS
We find that 10 apps (out of 140) send user location over
the Internet as compared to 6 apps on Android. However,
more third-parties collect and send user location over the
Internet on Android. This means that on iOS, there are less
third-parties but they are more broadly used by apps, on
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First-party Third-party Unidentified
Figure 6: # servers where user personal information is sent
by 140 apps.
the other hand there are more third-parties in Android used
by less apps.
As opposed to Android, we find that iOS apps leak less
user PII. In total, there are 8 (as opposed to 21 on Android)
third-parties where user PII is sent to on iOS. Also, both first
and third-parties did not send much data to their servers
in clear-text. There is only one third-party server and one
first-party server where user location is sent in clear-text on
iOS as compared to six and one respectively on Android.
Globally, we note that iOS apps sent lesser user PII over
the Internet as they use SSL more often than their Android
counterparts.
iOS apps also leak more information about the list of in-
stalled apps on the phone as compared to Android apps.
Nine third-parties know, at least, five names of the installed
packages. Flurry, for example, knows 25 apps installed on
the phone and is included in all these apps. The included
library from Flurry sends the name of the app in which it
is present as part of the communication with their servers.
Moreover, the collection of this information is in plain-text.
To get the complete list of these third-parties as well as the
package names known to them, please refer to Table 9 in the
appendix of the paper.
7. DISCUSSION
7.1 Comparing MobileAppScrutinator on An-
droid with TaintDroid
Fig. 7 compares privacy leaks reported by MobileApp-
Scrutinator on Android and TaintDroid for some personal
data. To know more details, please refer to the Table 2 in
the appendix of this paper that presents the PII (unique
identifiers and other private information) leaks reported by
running the same set of applications on TaintDroid 4.3. We
note that TaintDroid only reported the leakage of one unique
system identifier (IMEI) whereas MobileAppScrutinator re-
ports the leakge of six different unique identifiers. Moreover,
MobileAppScrutinator overall reported more privacy leaks
than TaintDroid. However, we interestingly found that both
MobileAppScrutinator and TaintDroid have false negatives.
This suggests that these tools should not be replacement
of one another but can actually be complimentary to each
other.
While comparing PII leaks reported by MobileAppScruti-
nator with TaintDroid, we found that TaintDroid did not
report any leakage of location coordinates. TaintDroid re-
ported leakge of Address Book (Contacts) information to
two third-parties whereas MobileAppScrutinator could only
detect Contacts leakge to only one party. Again it is in-
tersting to note here that parties, where Contacts informa-
tion was leaked, are mutually exclusive. TaintDroid also
reported the leakage of Browser History and SMS to one
and two parties respectively but, as MobileAppScrutinator
did not implement their leakge detection, we cannot com-
pare with respect to these two types of PII. On the con-
trary, MobileAppScrutinator was implemented to detect the
leakage of other kinds of private data, such as Accounts,
Operator Name, SIM Network Code and WiFi Scan/Con-
fig info, which current implementaion of TaintDroid (version
4.3) lacked.
7.2 Effectiveness of varous privacy safeguards
In order to provide transparency and control over pri-
vacy, both Android and iOS involve user decisions along
with mechanisms adopted by their respective systems. How-
ever, the approach followed by Android and iOS is differ-
ent: Android employs a static install-time permission system
whereas iOS solicits explicit user permission at runtime. No
doubt these OS mechanisms are mostly effective, they lack
behavirol analysis, i.e., when, where and how often the ac-
cessed information is sent over network. For example, it is
vital to distinguish the fact if the PII is sent to an applica-
tion server or to a remote third-party. In fact, a user giving
access to her PII for a desired service does not necessar-
ily mean that she also wants to share this information with
other parties, for example, advertisers or analytics compa-
nies. Similarly, an application accessing and sending user
location only at installation time is not the same as sending
it every five minutes.
Below we discuss the effectiveness of various privacy safe-
guards avaialabe on both Android and iOS based on our
experiments and results.
Resetting the “AdIdentifier" on iOS.
The effect of resetting the AdIdentifier is not similar to
“Deleting the cookies” in web tracking and could easily be
nullified. Resetting the AdIdentifier, in theory, is meant to
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Figure 7: Comparation of privacy leaks reported by MobileAppScrutinator on Android and TaintDroid
prevent trackers from linking the user activity before and
after the reset. However the trackers can easily detect the
AdIdentifier change and link the two values even if Apple ex-
plicitly tells not to do so. Apps are not technically restricted
by iOS to respect the resetting of AdIdentifier on iOS. In our
study, we find that 20% apps send the IdentifierForVendor2
along with the AdIdentifier to third-parties (Details in Ta-
ble 4 in appendix). It is noticeable that many third-parties
collect this identifier, whereas it was principally designed by
Apple to be used only by first-parties. As IdentifierForVen-
dor is being collected by third-parties, they are able to link
the AdIdentifiers before and after the reset.
Apps bypass the “AdIdentifier" on iOS.
We have seen that many apps are using other tracking
mechanisms to track the user in addition to the AdIdenti-
fier. In our experiments, we discovered that 93 apps out of
140 (i.e., approx. 66%) will continue to track the user after a
reset of the AdIdentifier by the user. This measurement does
not even consider the applications employing the previously
described technique to match the changed/reset AdIdenti-
fiers as we cannot be sure what third-parties do with their
data collected. In iOS 7, Apple banned the access to WiFi
MAC Address, but the percentage only reduces from 66%
to approximately 42% (60 Apps out of a total of 140 Apps.),
i.e., if we exclude the apps (24%) using only WiFi MAC
address as a unique identifier for tracking.
“Limit Ad Tracking” iOS privacy setting.
It turns out that the“AdIdentifier” is available to all Apps,
even after a user has chosen the “Limit Ad Tracking” option.
It is therefore ambiguous how iOS can enforce the “Limit
Ad Tracking” option. In fact, “Limit Ad Tracking” setting
appear to be misleading, as it gives the end-user a wrong
feeling of opting-out from device tracking. And if recently
2This is a stable identifier unique to all apps of a single
developer on a particular device, that cannot be changed or
reset by the user.
Apple started to reject apps accessing the AdIdentifier with-
out providing In-App Advertising [27], which is reasonable,
it still does not solve the core problem.
8. CONCLUSION
This paper first introduces the MobileAppScrutinator plat-
form for the study of third-party smartphone tracking. To
the best of our knowledge, this platform is the first one
that embraces both iOS and Android, using the same dy-
namic analysis methodology in both cases. For the first
time, it provides in-depth insight on the different PII ac-
cessed, hashed and/or encrypted and sent to remote servers,
either in clear-text or over SSL connections. This in-depth
analysis capability is a key to analyze the applications and
understand how they (ab)use personal information.
The second major contribution of this work is the be-
havioral analysis, thanks to the MobileAppScrutinator plat-
form, of 140 free and popular apps, selected so that they
are available on both mobile OSs in order to enable com-
parisons. Two important aspects are considered: first we
show that many stable identifiers are collected on Android,
in order to track individual devices in the long term. On
iOS, availability of system-level identifiers is less common,
but techniques have been designed to create new cross-app,
stable identifiers by third-parties themselves. The second
aspect concerns the user-related information. We show that
a significant amount of PII is being collected by third-parties
who implicitly know a lot about the user interests (e.g., by
collecting the list of apps installed or currently running).
Finally, this work enables to have a comparative view
of ongoing tracking on Andorid and iOS. Our experiments
show that Android apps are more privacy-invasive when
compared to iOS apps as the presence of third-parties is
clearly more frequent in Android applications. In all cases,
protective measures should be taken by device manufactur-
ers, OS designers and various regulatory authorities in a
coordinated way to control the collection and usage of PII.
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APPENDIX
Table 2: Detection of PII leakage using TaintDroid 4.3
(Same applications are tested to compare the results with
MobileAppScrutinator platform).
Server IMEI
Browser
History
Address
Book
SMS
T
h
ir
d
-p
a
rt
ie
s
C
le
a
r
hinet.net X
enovance.net X
aol.com X
kimsufi.com X
typhone.net X
betacie.net X
1e100.net X
dolphin-server.co.uk X
linode.com X
amazon.com X
ati-host.net X
S
S
L
amazonaws.com X X
1e100.net X
skyhookwireless.com X
akamaitechnologies.com X
F
ir
st
-p
a
rt
ie
s
C
le
a
r teamviewer.com X
badoo.com X
shazamteam.net X
S
S
L svcs.paypal.com X
amazon.com X
U
n
id
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
C
le
a
r
162.13.174.5 X
69.28.52.38 X
195.154.141.2 X
188.165.90.225 X
91.103.140.225 X
61.145.124.113 X
69.28.52.36 X
183.61.112.40 X
91.213.146.11 X
S
S
L
31.222.69.213 X
212.31.79.7 X
92.52.84.202 X
69.194.39.80 X
72.26.211.237 X
192.225.158.1 X
54.256.81.235 X
67.222.111.117 X
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Table 1: Unique System Identifiers transmitted by 140 Android Apps tested.
Server
AndroidID
PhoneNo
IMEI
SerialNo IMSI WiFi MAC
Modified Unmodified Modified Unmodified
T
h
ir
d
-p
a
r
ti
e
s
C
le
a
r
amazonaws.com X X X X
ad-x.co.uk X X X
mobilecore.com X X X
kochava.com X X
apsalar.com X X
mdotm.com X X
adtilt.com X X
estat.com X X
sophiacom.fr X
appnext.com X
flurry.com X
socialquantum.ru X
sitestat.com X
pureagency.com X
smartadserver.com X
xiti.com X
playhaven.com X
yoz.io X
seattleclouds.com X
ad-market.mobi X
S
S
L
tapjoyads.com X X X X X
airpush.com X X X X
revmob.com X X X
appwiz.com X X X
amazon.com X X
adcolony.com X X
fiksu.com X X
crittercism.com X X
googleapis.com X X
appsflyer.com X X
dataviz.com X
mobileapptracking.com X
F
ir
st
-p
a
r
ti
e
s C
le
a
r
mobage.com X X
ijinshan.com X
blitzer.de X
eurosport.com X
cdiscount.com X
S
S
L
google.com X X X
badoo.com X X X
dropbox.com X X
klm.com X
airfrance.com X
airbnb.com X
groupon.com X
adobe.com X
U
n
id
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
C
le
a
r
72.21.194.112 X X
dxsvr.com X X
69.28.52.39 X X
198.61.246.5 X X
183.61.112.40 X X
61.145.124.113 X X
74.217.75.7 X
183.61.112.40 X
linode.com X
93.184.219.20 X
107.6.111.137 X
startappexchange.com X
91.103.140.6 X
209.177.95.171 X
ati-host.net X
adkmob.com X
S
S
L fastly.net X
canal-off.sbw-paris.com X
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Table 3: Unique System Identifiers transmitted by 140 iOS Apps tested.
Server AdIdentifier UDID DeviceName
WiFi MAC
Pasteboard IDs
Modified Unmodified
T
h
ir
d
-p
a
r
ti
e
s
C
le
a
r
clara.net X X X
appads.com X
amazonaws.com X
1e100.net X
adcolony.com X
facebook.com X
your-server.de X
sophiacom.fr X
smartadserver.com X
mopub.com X
sofialys.net X
visuamobile.com X
swelen.com X
adtilt.com X
nanigans.com X
tapjoyads.com X
greystripe.com X
mdotm.com X
sofialys.net X
visuamobile.com X
admob.com X
ad-inside.com X
xiti.com X
2o7.net X
jumptap.com X
S
S
L
tapjoyads.com X X
trademob.net X X
adjust.io X
boxcar.io X
flurry.com X
tapjoy.com X
mobile-adbox.com X
fiksu.com X X
tapad.com X
testflightapp.com X
adtilt.com X
nanigans.com X
ad-x.co.uk X
crittercism.com X
facebook.com X
newrelic.com X
adzcore.com X
F
ir
st
-p
a
r
ti
e
s
C
le
a
r gameloft.com X X X
spotify.com X
disneyis.com X
mobiata.com X
S
S
L
gameloft.com X X
paypal.com X X X
booking.com X
eamobile.com X
expedia.com X
U
n
id
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
C
le
a
r
amazonaws.com X X X
igstudios.in X
69.71.216.204 X
198.105.199.145 X
akamaitechnologies.com X
softlayer.com X
cloud-ips.com X
mydas.mobi X
mkhoj.com X
74.217.75.7/8 X
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Table 5: User PII transmitted by a total of 140 Android Apps tested.
Server Accounts Contacts Location Operator Name SIM Network code WiFi Scan/Config
T
h
ir
d
-p
a
rt
ie
s C
le
a
r
seventynine.mobi X X
kiip.me X X
google.com X X
3g.cn X
doubleclick.net X
goforandroid.com X
adtilt.com X
2o7.net X
nexage.com X
ad-market.mobi X
mopub.com X
mydas.mobi X
startappex-
change.com
X
S
S
L
airpush.com X X
appwiz.com X X
agoop.net X X
tapjoyads.com X X
crittercism.com X
inmobi.com X
appsflyer.com X
googleapis.com X
F
ir
st
-p
a
rt
ie
s
C
le
a
r betomorrow.com X X X
avast.com X X
S
S
L
google.com X X X
badoo.com X X X X
checkmin.com X
groupon.de X
m6replay.fr X
U
n
id
e
n
ti
fi
e
d
C
le
a
r
91.103.140.193 X X X
adkmob.com X
dsxvr.com X
amazonaws.com X
183.61.112.40 X
Table 6: User PII transmitted by a total of 140 iOS Apps tested.
Server Accounts AddressBook Device Name Location SIM Network Name SIM Number
T
h
ir
d
-p
a
rt
ie
s
C
le
a
r clara.net X
amazonaws.com X
bkt.mobi X
S
S
L
capptain.com X X
fring.com X
crittercism.com X
boxcar.io X
testflightapp.com X
F
ir
st
-p
a
rt
ie
s
C
le
a
r mobilevoip.com X
groupon.de X
sncf.com X
S
S
L
groupon.de X X
ebay.com X
foursquare.com X
paypal.com X
twitter.com X
Table 4: Servers where IdentifierForVendor is communicated
in 140 iOS Apps tested.
Third-parties First-parties
Clear SSL Clear SSL
mobileroadie.com,
clara.net,
appads.com,
adcolony.com,
sophiacom.fr,
7mobile7.com,
sitestat.com,
mediatemple.net
tapjoyads.com,
tapjoy.com,
adzcore.com,
fiksu.com,
crittercism.com,
ad-x.co.uk
eurosport.com,
gameloft.com
eamobile.com,
dailymotion.com,
foursquare.com,
google.com,
googleapis.com,
paypal.com
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Table 7: Different Pasteboard Names, Types and Values created by 140 iOS Apps tested.
Pasteboard Names Pasteboard Types Pasteboard Values
fb app attribution, org.OpenUDID.slot.0 to 99,
com.hasoffers.matsdkref, com.ad4screen.bma4s.dLOG,
com.ad4screen.bma4savedata124780,
com.flurry.pasteboard, com.fiksu.288429040-store,
com.fiksu.pb-0 to 19, org.secureudid-0 to 99,
com.ebay.identity, com.paypal.dyson.linker id,
AmazonAdDebugSettings,
CWorks.5cb7c5449e677be888147c58,
amobeePasteboard, com.google.maps,
com.google.plus.com.deezer.Deezer,
com.bmw.a4a.switcher.featureInfos and many more
com.crittercism.uuid,
org.OpenUDID,public.utf8-plain-text, com.fiksu.id,
public.secureudid, com.google.maps.SSUC,
com.flurry.UID, com.bmw.a4a.switcher.featureinfo
container,
WiFi MAC Address,
2501110D-69B7-415A-896B-4F7A83591263,
ID521411E3-D88E-426E-9B7D-
1060C0772C89969DC466, 363046414344413130433230,
8211d087-ca5b-42c3-a1a2-7b3779f6c206,
81C65A17-9F0E-4BFE-83A7-1C2C070C3353,
E6644EEB-04B3-4AEF-8562-A2C29E323CCE,
55b0a791-517e-4bd4-8398-414dd527417b, And other
binary data instances
Table 8: List of third-parties knowing names of installed packages on Android (out of a total of 140 Apps tested).
Third-party (Comm type) Process Names
trademob.com(SSL) All the processes running on the phone
google.com(SSL) All the processes running on the phone
google-analytics.com(SSL)
com.anydo, com.rechild.advancedtaskkiller, com.spotify.mobile.android.ui, com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox,
com.dailymotion.dailymotion, com.aa.android, com.comuto, com.airbnb.android
doubleclick.net(plain-text) com.tagdroid.android, com.rechild.advancedtaskkiller, bbc.mobile.news.ww, ua.in.android wallpapers.spring nature
crashlytics.com(SSL) com.evernote, com.path, com.lslk.sleepbot, com.twitter.android, com.dailymotion.dailymotion
Table 9: List of third-parties knowing names of installed packages on iOS (out of a total of 140 Apps tested).
Third-party (Comm type) Process Names
flurry.com(plain-text)
TopEleven, Bible, RATP, Transilien, TripIt, DespicableMe, FlyAirIndia, Viadeo, Bankin’, VDM, OCB, DuplexA86, SleepBot, Snapchat,
Appygraph, Booking.com, foodspotting, Badoo, EDF-Releve, WorldCup2011, Quora, UrbanDictionary, babbelSpanish, MyLittleParis, Volkswagen
google-analytics.com(SSL) InstantBeautyProduction, Evernote, LILIGO, Transilien, Viadeo, VDM, comuto, easyjet, VintedFR, Volkswagen
crashlytics.com(SSL) dailymotion, TopEleven, AmazonFR, Path, RunKeeper, foodspotting, babbelSpanish, Deezer
urbanairship.com(SSL) Wimbledon, RATP, HootSuite, DuplexA86, Appygraph, foodspotting, Volkswagen
xiti.com(plain-text) laposte, ARTE, myTF1, lequipe, SoundCloud, 20minv3, Leboncoin
admob.com(plain-text) VSC, BBCNews, WorldCup2011, RF12, UrbanDictionary
capptain.com(plain-text) Viadeo, myTF1, rtl-fr-radios, 20minv3, iDTGV
tapjoy.com(SSL) TopEleven, Bible, DespicableMe, OCB, MCT
14
